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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
______________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
ANTHONY F. WISE, #78-A-3134,
Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
Of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
-against-

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2007-0309.076
INDEX # 2007-0746
ORI # NY016015J

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE
Respondent.
______________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the petition of Anthony F. Wise, verified on May 15, 2007, and stamped as
filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on June 5, 2007. Petitioner, who is an inmate
at the Bare Hill Correctional Facility, is challenging the December 2006, determination
denying him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court
issued an Order to Show Cause on June 18, 2007, and has since received and reviewed
respondent’s Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on July 27,
2007, together with a Letter Memorandum of that date. The Court has also received and
reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s Office on
August 10, 2007.
On September 27, 1978, petitioner was sentenced in County Court, Dutchess
County, as a second felony offender, to two indeterminate terms of 25 years to life each
upon his conviction, after a verdict, of two counts of Murder 2° and to two indeterminate
terms of 12 ½ to 25 years each upon his conviction, after a verdict, of Robbery 1° and
Burglary 1°. All sentences were to run concurrently with each other.
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Petitioner appeared before his third parole board on December 6, 2006. The board
again denied petitioner release and directed that he be held for an additional 24 months.
The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“FOLLOWING A CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD, PERSONAL
INTERVIEW, PAROLE IS DENIED. BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
FACTORS. YOU, IN CONCERT WITH TWO OTHERS, BURGLARIZED
THE RESIDENCE OF THREE ELDERLY SISTERS, ROBBED THEM,
RANSACKED THE PREMISES. IN THE COURSE OF THIS CRIME, THE
VICTIMS WERE TIED HAND AND FOOT, BEATEN, AND THE YOUNGER
DIED OF STRANGULATION. YOU HAD A PRIOR HISTORY AS A
YOUTHFUL OFFENDER AND A PRIOR STATE TERM. THE TERROR
YOU INFLICTED ON YOUR VICTIMS, DEATH, LACK OF CONCERN FOR
THEIR WELL BEING, MAKE YOUR RELEASE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS
TIME. AS TO RELEASE YOU NOW WOULD DEPRECATE THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE, UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW.”
Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, but the Appeals Unit failed to issue its
findings and recommendations within the time prescribed in 9 NYCRR 8006.4(c). This
proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
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interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where the minimum period of imprisonment
was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the seriousness of
the underlying offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record. See Executive Law §259i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a). Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily
deemed to be judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law
(Executive Law §259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on
impropriety. See Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908,
Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d
1051. Unless the petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court
must presume that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with
statutory requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York
State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner contends that the parole denial determination was focused solely on the
serious nature of the instant offense and past priors; that respondent’s denial en masse
of parole to those convicted of homicide and manslaughter offenses is the result of
irrational decision making allegedly as a result of the previous governor’s campaign to
eliminate parole for all violent felony offenders; that he was denied due process because
there was no substantial evidence to show his release would not be appropriate because
of the serious nature of the crime; that the board violated Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) by
issuing vague and conclusory reasons for its decision, failing to provide a reasoned rational
explanation for its decision, and failing to provide guidance as to how he could earn parole
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release at his next appearance; and that he was denied equal protection by being denied
parole when similarly situated persons were granted parole.
Respondent contends that judicial intervention with respect to parole decisions is
warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety; that the
board’s emphasis on the serious nature of the petitioner’s crime does not by itself
demonstrate such irrationality; that there is nothing in the board’s decision to support the
claim that the decision was the result of an informal executive policy to deny parole to
violent felons; that the standard for parole release is not substantial evidence but is
discretionary and will not be disturbed absent a showing of irrationality bordering on
impropriety; that the board sufficiently detailed its decision to permit intelligent judicial
review of the grounds for the denial; that there is no due process right to have an
explanation of what one may do to improve one’s chances for parole in the future; and that
the equal protection argument fails when the board’s determination bears a rational
relationship to the objective of community safety and respect for the law.
Petitioner in his Reply essentially raise the same arguments set forth in his Verified
Petition, adding, inter alia, that he has completed every program assigned and requested
of him by the Department of Correctional Services, that prisoners should be given detailed
reasons for denial of parole, that if other similarly situated persons have been granted
parole, he too should be granted parole, and that a review of the record will show that the
board’s failure to weigh all relevant statutory factors was arbitrary and capricious.
The Court initially observes that a parole denial determination is not subject to
judicial review under the substantial evidence standard. See Valderrama v. Travis, 19
AD3d 904. Rather, as noted previously, discretionary parole determinations made in
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accordance with statutory requirements are not subject to judicial review unless affected
by irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470.
Although it may be argued the board placed particular emphasis on the heinous
nature of petitioner’s underlying crimes, the board is not required to give equal weight to
the statutory factors it considered in reaching its determination. See Freeman v. New
York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1174 and Sterling v. Dennison, 38 AD3d 1145. The
Board is also not required to enumerate each of the statutory factors, or to discuss each
factor it considered. See Farid v. Travis, 239 AD2d 629. The record discloses that the
board did not deny petitioner parole release based solely upon the violent nature of his
crimes. Rather, at the hearing it considered the relevant factors set forth in Executive Law
§259-i, including petitioner's prior criminal history, his clean prison disciplinary record
since 2004, and his post-release plans. Petitioner’s claim the seriousness of the instant
offense was the sole basis for the denial of release is, therefore, without merit.
Petitioner's contention that the determination was premised on an alleged
executive policy to deny parole to violent felons has not been established and thus is
rejected. See Motti v. Dennison, 38 AD3d 1030 and Wood v. Dennison, 25 AD2d 1056.
Petitioner's contention that he was deprived of due process and a meaningful parole
hearing because the board failed to indicate the areas in which petitioner fell short of
qualifying for parole is likewise unavailing. “Executive Law § 259-i does not create an
entitlement to release on parole and therefore does not create interests entitled to due
process protection.” Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1174, 1175,
citing, inter alia, Paunetto v. Hammock, 516 F.Supp. 1367, 1367-1368 (other citations
omitted).

Notwithstanding petitioner's contention to the contrary, there is no
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requirement that the Board provide petitioner with guidelines to improve his chance of
securing parole at his next parole appearance. See Freeman, supra. In addition, the Court
finds that the parole denial determination was sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent
appellate review and was otherwise in compliance with statutory mandates. See Ek v.
Travis, 20 AD3d 667, rev’g 7 Misc 3d 1031 (A), app dis 5 NY3d 862. Finally, the Court is
unpersuaded by petitioner’s conclusory equal protection claim that certain unnamed
“similarly situated” inmates were granted parole. See Tatta v. Dennison, 26 AD3d 663
and Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d 904.
The decision of the board and the record of the hearing establishes that the
petitioner’s criminal history, the instant offense, disciplinary record, and post-release
plans were considered, thereby satisfying the requirements of Executive Law §259-i. See
Davis v. New York State Board of Parole, 35 AD3d 1112. Inasmuch as the record
establishes that petitioner was denied parole based upon the applicable statutory factors
and there is no showing of “irrationality bordering on impropriety” further judicial review
is not warranted.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

December 31 , 2007, at
Indian Lake, New York.

______________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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